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A CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: CARSON EX
REL. O.C. V. MAKIN AND THE FUTURE OF MAINE’S
NONSECTARIAN REQUIREMENT
Blake E. McCartney*
ABSTRACT
School choice advocates, such as the nonprofit libertarian law firm, The Institute
for Justice, have spent decades arguing that states violate the Free Exercise Clause
when they exclude private religious schools from public programs that otherwise
provide public dollars to non-religious private schools. Recently, in Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court effectively agreed with that
sentiment. After this victory, the Institute for Justice returned to the state of Maine
to represent three sets of parents in a renewed effort to defeat Maine’s nonsectarian
requirement in federal court. Maine’s nonsectarian requirement provides that private
religious schools may not participate in Maine’s town tuitioning program, which
allows students in towns that do not have public schools to receive state funding to
attend a private or public school of their choice.
This Note analyzes that case: Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin. In Carson, the
First Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. I posit that the reasoning the First Circuit
deployed in Carson may not be durable and that if the Supreme Court were to grant
the plaintiff-appellants’ petition for certiorari, the Court would likely invalidate
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement. I then analyze the effect the elimination of the
nonsectarian requirement would have on Maine’s public schools and how school
choice opponents may wish to move forward. More specifically, I suggest that
Maine and the rest of the nation should consider investing in its public schools before
outsourcing public education to private entities and interest groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite extensive controversy,1 the “educational choice” or “school choice”
movement has gained significant traction in the past few decades. Educational
choice is the ideology that a parent should be to able to use public funds to send her
child to the school of her choosing, including a private religious school. 2 There are
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2022. I am grateful to my brother, J.
William McCartney, for initially telling me about the Carson case, my professors and mentors for their
invaluable feedback, and my partner and family for their unwavering support.
1. Brett A. Geier, Funding God’s Schools—A Legal Analysis of Appropriating Public Dollars to
Parochial Schools: Does Michigan’s Latest Legislation Violate the Separation of Church and State?, 49
J.L. & EDUC. 285, 296 (2020) (“In particular, school funding raises a contentious debate. Conflicting
ideologies have polarized funding discourse at the local, state, and federal levels. Of the issues
embedded within school funding, allowing religious schools to receive public funds has proven to be
highly controversial.”).
2. Educational Choice, THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/issues/school-choice/ [https://perma.cc/
7C65-LVST] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). It should be noted that proponents of school choice still refer
to programs that exclude religious schools as “school choice programs.” See School Choice in America
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several types of so-called educational choice programs that state legislatures have
implemented, including: (1) voucher programs, (2) town tuitioning programs, and
(3) tax-credit scholarships. Voucher programs use public funds to provide families
with tuition vouchers that they may use to pay all or part of private school tuition.3
In contrast, town tuitioning programs, which are seen in Maine, Vermont, and New
Hampshire,4 allow students who live in towns that do not have local public schools
to use their education tax dollars at a neighboring public school or an approved
private school of the parents’ choice.5 Finally, tax-credit scholarships grant tax
credits to people who donate to nonprofits that provide individuals with private
school scholarships.6
In recent years, school choice gained more political attention because of former
President Trump’s support of the movement and his divisive decision to nominate
Betsy DeVos as the Secretary of Education. Devos is a school choice advocate, and
before she worked in the White House she was the board chairwoman of the
American Federation for Children, which describes itself as “the nation’s voice for
educational choice.”7 Although both former President Trump and DeVos pushed for
school choice and tried to the rekindle support for such policies after the onset of the
Coronavirus pandemic, they ultimately failed to make any significant progress on
educational choice policy at a national level.8
In the legal realm, the major force behind the educational choice movement is
The Institute for Justice (“IJ”).9 IJ is a public interest law firm that litigated two of
the key Supreme Court educational choice cases, Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, as well as many other impactful lower

Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/ [https://
perma.cc/4ACT-DWNF] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). For example, Maine’s town tuitioning program,
which is discussed at length in this Note, is often referred to as a school choice program even though it
does not provide funds to private religious schools. See Maine – Town Tuitioning Program, EDCHOICE,
https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/maine-town-tuitioning-program/ [https://perma.cc/
5UN3-K9VJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
3. Types of School Choice, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-of-schoolchoice/ [https://perma.cc/8AUR-6Y2G] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
4. See School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/schoolchoice/school-choice-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/R2SP-65AJ ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
5. Id.
6. Id. (“Tax-credit scholarships allow taxpayers to receive full or partial tax credits when they
donate to nonprofits that provide private school scholarships.”).
7. Alia Wong, Public Opinion Shifts in Favor of School Choice, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/school-choice-gaining-popularity/568063/
[https://perma.cc/A6BK-KMWC] (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. See Collin Binkley, Trump, DeVos Raise School Choice in Appeal to Vexed Parents,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/school-choice-education-betsy-devosvirus-outbreak-archive-ca871432d35abcb71bf12cf7211f9c25 [https://perma.cc/PJC6-E28J]. During the
onset of the Coronavirus pandemic and virtual schooling, the Trump administration hoped to “convert []
parents’ frustration and anger into newfound support for school choice policies that Education Secretary
Betsy DeVos ha[d] long championed but struggled to advance nationally.” Id.
9. See generally THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/ [https://perma.cc/F4H4-YZGD] (last visited
Apr. 21, 2021).
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court cases.10 Most recently, in Espinoza, the Court held in favor of IJ’s clients, who
were parents that wished to use funding from a Montana tax-credit scholarship
program to send their children to private religious schools. 11 The Court explained
that once a state decides to subsidize private education, “it cannot disqualify some
private schools solely because they are religious.” 12 After Espinoza, school choice
advocates believed they had struck gold.13
IJ was active in Maine long before Espinoza was decided. Including Carson ex
rel. O.C. v. Makin—the subject of this Note—IJ has filed three school choice
lawsuits in the state.14 The organization’s goal is to invalidate a provision of Maine
law, commonly referred to as “Section 2951(2)” or “Maine’s nonsectarian
requirement.”15 The nonsectarian requirement excludes private religious schools
from Maine’s town tuitioning program. 16 IJ filed its first Maine-based school choice
suit in the 1990s, on behalf of parents who wished to use Maine’s town tuitioning
program to pay for their children’s tuition at Cheverus High School, a private
Catholic school.17 The case, Bagley v. Raymond School Department, was ultimately
unsuccessful.18 Several years later, IJ brought a very similar and equally unfruitful
suit: Anderson v. Town of Durham.19
A few years after filing Espinoza in Montana state court, IJ returned to Maine
and filed Carson in the Federal District Court for the District of Maine.20 The facts
in Carson are quite similar to the facts in Espinoza. In both cases, IJ represented
parents who wanted to use state funding to send their children to private parochial
schools.21 Because the plaintiffs’ motivations in the cases were similar and the
actions were filed so closely together, a key educational choice decision—Trinity
10. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also Recent Educational Choice Cases, THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/
issues/school-choice/ [https://perma.cc/87BW-H29D] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
11. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251, 2262.
12. Id. at 2261.
13. See John Kramer, IJ Releases New Educational Choice Guide to State Constitutions After
Espinoza, THE INST. FOR JUST. (July 7, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/ij-releases-new-educationalchoice-guide-to-state-constitutions-after-espinoza/ [https://perma.cc/N972-MQ5U].
14. See Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F. Supp. 3d 207 (D. Me. 2019); Anderson v. Town of
Durham, 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1051 (2006); Bagley v. Raymond Sch.
Dep't, 1999 ME 60, 728 A.2d 127, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999).
15. See 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018). Prior to the enactment of Section 2951(2) in 1981,
religious schools were allowed to apply to become approved private schools for purposes of town
tuitioning. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 127; see also Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21,
25 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that the suit “takes aim at the program’s requirement that a private school
must be a ‘nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution’ to qualify as ‘approved’ to receive tuition assistance payments”).
16. § 2951(2).
17. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶¶ 6-9, 728 A.2d 127.
18. Id. ¶ 17.
19. 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944.
20. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020)
(originally filed on Dec. 16, 2015; decided on June 30, 2020); Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F.
Supp. 3d 207 (D. Me. 2019) (originally filed on Aug. 21, 2018).
21. See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262; Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2020).
However, the program at issue in Carson—Maine’s town tuitioning program—is different than the taxcredit program litigated in Espinoza.
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Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer—played a central role in both matters.22 In
addition, after Espinoza, IJ filed a 28(j) letter23 and tried to use the opinion to bolster
the Carson case.24 But, even with the heft of Espinoza behind IJ’s arguments, the
First Circuit decided Carson in favor of the Maine Department of Education.25 The
Court distinguished Carson from Espinoza and its predecessor Trinity Lutheran,
with the help of the “status-use” distinction, which is discussed in great detail
throughout this Note.26 Although Carson provides some much welcome reassurance
to Establishment Clause proponents and states that do not wish to fund private
parochial schools, it stands on tenuous footing.
This Note examines the constitutionality of school choice programs that provide
public aid to private religious schools. Part II of this Note will examine the legal
precedent in school funding cases that implicate the Religion Clauses and explain
how the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved over time. Part III will outline the facts
of Carson and analyze the First Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV will discuss the
durability of Carson, and Part V will conclude with commentary on the future of
school choice in Maine.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The educational choice movement is rooted in the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 The
Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”28 And the Free Exercise Clause declares that “Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.29 With the growing
popularity of school choice programs, our nation’s public schools have become
“epicenter[s] for religious and state conflict,” implicating the Religion Clauses.30
At base, the Free Exercise Clause “protect[s] religious observers against unequal
treatment.”31 The Supreme Court has held that, in general, neutral and generally
applicable laws that happen to burden an individual’s exercise of religion do not
violate the Free Exercise Clause.32 On the other hand, a law that burdens religious

22. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); see Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254-55; Carson, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 209,
210-12.
23. A “28(j) letter” is a letter that a party may send to the circuit clerk if “pertinent and significant
authorities [have] come to [the] party’s attention after the party’s brief has been filed—or after oral
argument but before decision.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).
24. Appellant’s Statement of Supplemental Authority at 2, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746).
25. Carson, 979 F.3d at 49.
26. Id. at 37-40.
27. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (citing Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
108 (1943) (“The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth . . . commands
that a state ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .’”)).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. Id.
30. Geier, supra note 1, at 287.
31. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
32. See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) ("[I]f prohibiting the exercise of
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,
the First Amendment has not been offended.”).
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exercise “that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny.”33 In other words, laws that exclude religious individuals
because of their religious status implicate the Free Exercise Clause and are subject
to strict scrutiny.34 At the same time, the Establishment Clause forbids the
government from getting too entangled with religion. 35 Thus, the Religion Clauses
are in a sort of eternal tug of war.
A. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing and Lemon v. Kurtzman
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the context of school funding has evolved
substantially over the years, with the Court’s early Establishment Clause cases
calling for greater separation of church and state. 36 For example, in Everson v. Board
of Education of Ewing, the Court proclaimed “[t]he First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.”37 In that case, the Court ultimately decided
that a New Jersey funding program that reimbursed parents who sent their children
to private schools—including parochial schools—for transportation costs did not
violate the Establishment Clause.38 In doing so, the Court emphasized that the
program was only acceptable because the state was providing funding to the parents
of the children, not the private religious schools themselves. 39
Several decades later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court examined the tougher
question of whether states could provide aid directly to private religious schools. 40
There were two programs at issue in Lemon: (1) a Pennsylvania program that
reimbursed nonpublic schools for the cost of teacher salaries and educational
materials in secular subjects, and (2) a Rhode Island program that directly paid
33. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546.
34. Id. Lukumi is associated with the line of case law in which the Supreme Court “has
increasingly acknowledged ‘that nondiscrimination is crucial to religious freedom’ and has struck down
laws that discriminate against religion.” Brooke Reczka, Note, The Wrong Choice to Address School
Choice: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
237, 241 (2020); see generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397
U.S. 665, 674 (1969)) (establishing a three-part test to ensure that statutes do not violate the
Establishment Clause by fostering “an excessive government entanglement with religion”); Walz, 397
U.S. at 670 (“[T]he very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts—one that seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947);
see also Stephanie H. Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701, 1702-03 (2020)
(positing that the Court’s post-Lemon decisions, including American Legion v. American Humanist
Association, indicate the first two prongs of the Lemon test are dead, but the entanglement prong
remains somewhat intact).
36. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
37. Id. at 18. It should be noted that several scholars argue the majority’s position on strict
separation of church and state was based on a misconception of U.S. history. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries,
Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 285-86
(2010).
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
39. Id. at 17-18.
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362, 373 (1975), overruled
by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Pennsylvania program
insofar as it provided textbooks loans to private religious schools, but not insofar as it provided funds for
other educational services).
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nonpublic school teachers a fifteen percent supplement to their regular salary. 41 The
Lemon Court determined that both programs violated the Establishment Clause by
using a new three-pronged test that aimed to detect “excessive entanglement between
government and religion.”42 Despite the holding, the Court started to soften its “high
and impregnable” wall rhetoric.43 Chief Justice Burger declared that the line of
separation between church and state is “far from being a ‘wall.’”44 He explained that
it is instead “a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.”45 As time went on, the line of separation
between church and state would become increasingly blurry. 46
B. Mitchell v. Helms and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Mitchell v. Helms, and several cases before it, marked a significant pivot from
the Court’s stronger Establishment Clause precedent.47 In Mitchell, a plurality of the
Court decided that a federal program that provided funding to lend educational
materials to public and private secular and non-secular schools did not violate the
Establishment Clause.48 This was the same kind of direct aid to a private religious
school that the Court had rejected on Establishment Clause grounds in Lemon.
However, Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, explained that the Court had
“departed from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly assists the
educational function of a religious school is invalid.” 49 Justice Thomas proffered
that whether a government program violates the Establishment Clause depends upon
whether “any religious indoctrination that occurs in those schools could reasonably
be attributed to governmental action.”50 Ultimately, the plurality decided that
“religious indoctrination” had not occurred in this case because eligibility standards
for the aid were neutral, and the materials were secular.51
The Court took a step further in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, holding that Ohio
41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07 (1971).
42. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1969)) (proclaiming that,
in order to avoid offending the Establishment clause, a statute must (1) “have a secular legislative
purpose;” (2) not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion”).
43. Id. at 614.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra Section II(B).
47. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding that Ohio violated the Establishment
Clause by using public funds to provide instructional materials, equipment, and transportation for field
trips to private school students), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that a
federal program which provided funding to lend educational materials to public and private secular and
non-secular schools did not violate the Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that a school district program which used public funds to provide classes to
nonpublic school students violated the Establishment Clause), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit New York from using federal funds
to send public school teachers into private religious schools to teach special education to low income
students).
48. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.
49. Id. at 816 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225).
50. Id. at 809; see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31.
51. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 830-32.
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did not offend the Establishment Clause when it created a publicly funded program
that allowed parents to choose to use vouchers to send their children to private
religious schools, among other options.52 The Court determined that Ohio’s program
was “neutral with respect to religion” and did not offend the Establishment Clause—
or involve excess entanglement—because individuals were not forced to choose a
parochial school, but rather were given the opportunity to make a “true private
choice.”53 After Zelman, it was clear that states were free to offer school voucher
programs that included private religious schools, so long as individuals were not
coerced into choosing the religious schools.
In Trinity Lutheran and later in Espinoza, the Court would come full circle on
its early Establishment Clause precedent and claim that not only can a state decide
to provide public funds to a religious school without violating the Establishment
Clause, but under the Free Exercise Clause, states may be compelled to provide
religious schools and organizations with public benefits. 54 In these cases, the Court’s
Establishment Clause inquiry seemed to boil down to the spineless “status-use”
distinction, which this Note analyzes and discusses in Parts II(b)(ii), II(b)(iii), III,
and IV.55 After Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, the Establishment Clause arguably
has an uncertain future.
C. Locke v. Davey
In recent years, the Court has made several key decisions on Free Exercise
challenges in the context of school funding. In Locke v. Davey, the Court held that
it was within the state of Washington’s discretion to maintain a publicly funded
postsecondary scholarship program that explicitly prohibited participants from using
their scholarship funds to pursue degrees in devotional theology. 56 Joshua Davey
52. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002). As the text mentioned earlier,
Zelman was an IJ case.
53. Id. at 662.
54. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that Missouri
could not exclude a church, which also hosted a daycare and preschool, from a public program that
provided funds for playground resurfacing under the Free Exercise Clause); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (holding that Montana could not exclude private religious schools from
a publicly funded school tax-credit program without violating the Free Exercise Clause); see also Micah
Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Establishment Clause Appeasement, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 276-77
(2019) (observing that in the context of the Religion Clauses and government funding, “the Court has all
but rejected the Lemon framework, which prohibited the state from subsidizing the religious activities of
religious organizations, in favor of a ‘neutrality’ model, which not only allows but sometimes requires
state funding of religion”).
55. See infra Sections II(D), II(E), III, and IV.
56. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-17 (2004). This prohibition on funding for devotional
theology majors was created to ensure the program complied with Washington’s constitution. Id. at
719. Washington’s constitution, like many state constitutions, contains a “no-aid” provision, which has
been “interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students
for the ministry.” Id. Thirty-eight states have similar “no-aid provisions.” Brief of Respondents at 2, 9,
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (No. 18-1195). These provisions vary in force and language, but generally
state that public aid may not be provided to “sectarian schools.” Id. at 2. Many no-aid provisions are
so-called “Blaine Amendments,” named after Senator Blaine of Maine. Depending on who you ask, all
of the states’ no-aid provisions are rooted in anti-Catholic sentiment. Compare Holly Hollman,
Symposium: What’s “the Use” of the Constitution’s Distinctive Treatment of Religion if it is

2021]

CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE

321

was awarded one of these scholarships, and he wished to use it to pay for his dual
degree in pastoral ministries and business management/administration. 57 However,
the pastoral ministries degree was inherently devotional, and it was therefore
excluded under the program. 58 When Davey lost his scholarship because he refused
to drop his major in pastoral ministries, he sued Washington state officials and
argued that the program rules violated the Free Exercise Clause, among other
claims.59
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected Davey’s contention that the program was
“presumptively unconstitutional because it was not facially neutral with regard to
religion.”60 First, the Court acknowledged that the state “could permit [scholarship
recipients] to pursue a degree in devotional theology.” 61 However, the Court
explained that Washington did not have to do so in this case because there is room
for “play in the joints” between the clauses, and “there are some state actions
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause.”62 Second, the majority distinguished the scholarship program from the
Lukumi line of cases63 by noting “the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called
that) is of a far milder kind.”64 The Court emphasized that the scholarship program
did not impose “criminal [or] civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite”
and did “not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving
a government benefit.”65 In bolstering this argument, the Court noted that the
prohibition on funding for devotional theology was not born of religious animus. 66
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “since the founding of our country,”
there has been a general unwillingness to use taxpayer funds to support the
Disregarded as Discrimination?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2020, 10:14 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/symposium-whats-the-use-of-the-constitutions-distinctivetreatment-of-religion-if-it-is-disregarded-as-discrimination/ (“Because many no-funding provisions
predated the advent of significant Catholic immigration, the religious liberty interests they serve cannot
properly be dismissed as related to any anti-religious bias.”), with Richard D. Komer, Trinity Lutheran
and the Future of Educational Choice: Implications for State Blaine Amendments, 44 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 551, 565, 577-78 (2018) (arguing that Blaine Amendments were motivated by antiCatholic sentiment). Interestingly, even though Senator Blaine was from Maine, Maine does not have a
no-aid provision in its constitution. Maine created its nonsectarian requirement for a variety of reasons,
including providing a secular public-school equivalent. See Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21,
47 (1st Cir. 2020).
57. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 717-18.
60. Id. at 720.
61. Id. at 719.
62. Id. at 718-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court first used the phrase “play in the
joints” in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1969). Judge Lipez of the First Circuit has
commented: “‘play in the joints’ is a slippery phrase with no settled meaning.” Kermit V. Lipez,
Reflections on the Church/State Puzzle, 72 ME. L. REV. 325, 336 n.58 (2020); see also Locke, 540 U.S.
at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to “play in the joints” as “not so much a legal principle as a
refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing constitutional directives”).
63. See Reczka, supra note 34, at 241-42.
64. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.
65. Id. at 720-21.
66. The Court reasoned that the no-aid provision in Washington’s Constitution was not a “Blaine
Amendment” rooted in anti-Catholic sentiment. Id. at 723 n.7.
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ministry.67
The dissenters believed that the Court’s reasoning was weak and lacked a
workable test, but the next school funding case would fabricate a new rule—the
status-use distinction—out of the Locke holding.68
D. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer
In 2017, thirteen years after Locke, the Supreme Court decided Trinity Lutheran.
The majority held that Missouri violated the Free Exercise Clause when it excluded
a church—which also hosted a daycare and preschool—from a public program that
provided funds for playground resurfacing.69 The Court asserted that Missouri’s
policy “expressly discriminate[d] against otherwise eligible recipients by
disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character”
and that such a policy required strict scrutiny.70 Chief Justice Roberts distinguished
Locke by formulating the status-use distinction.71 The Chief Justice argued that,
unlike Joshua Davey, who “was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed
to do,” the Trinity Lutheran plaintiffs were denied the playground resurfacing funds
because of who they were.72 Justices Kagan and Breyer joined the majority in Trinity
Lutheran, likely because the Chief Justice agreed to add his now infamous footnote,
which caveated: “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of
funding or other forms of discrimination.” 73 The Court’s decision was condemned
by the dissenters,74 and while some hoped this status-use reasoning would be cabined
to a playground case, Espinoza dashed those hopes.75
E. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
The program at issue in Espinoza was established by the Montana State
67. Id. at 722-23 (“Since the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings against
procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an ‘established’
religion. . . . Most States that sought to avoid such an establishment around the time of the founding
placed in their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to support the ministry.”).
68. See id. at 726-35. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent and added his own brief
dissenting opinion. Id.; see infra Section II(D) (discussing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v.
Comer).
69. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024-25 (2017).
70. See id. at 2021. Missouri does have a no-aid provision that prohibits the state from providing
aid to “any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher
thereof, as such.” Id. at 2017 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7). The Trinity Lutheran opinion did not
discuss whether Missouri’s no-aid provision was born of anti-Catholic sentiment.
71. Id. at 2016; see Andrew A. Thompson, Note, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer
and the “Play in the Joints Between Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion, 96 TEX. L. REV.
1079, 1089 (arguing that the Chief Justice invented the status-use distinction “out of whole cloth”).
72. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016.
73. Id. at 2024 n.3.
74. Id. at 2038 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “does not acknowledge that
our precedents have expressly approved of a government’s choice to draw lines based on an entity’s
religious status”).
75. See Reczka, supra note 34, at 251; see generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S.
Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
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Legislature, and it provided tuition aid to parents who chose to send their children to
private schools.76 The program worked by granting a tax credit to anyone who
donated to a certain scholarship organization. 77 These scholarship organizations
would, in turn, award scholarship funds to children who attended private schools.78
Shortly after the legislature created the program, Montana’s Department of Revenue
enacted Rule 1.79 Rule 1 stated that the scholarships could not be used at sectarian
schools, and it was created so that the program would conform with Montana’s noaid provision.80
In response to Rule 1, three mothers—represented by IJ—filed suit in Montana
state court.81 The mothers wished to use the scholarships to send their children to
religious schools and alleged that the program, and Rule 1, discriminated against
them “on the basis of their religious views.” 82 The case made its way up to the
Montana Supreme Court, which held that the program had to be invalidated
altogether.83 After that decision, the Supreme Court granted the mothers’ petition
for certiorari.84
A five-justice majority held for the mothers. 85 In doing so, it relied heavily on
Trinity Lutheran and framed the case in terms of a free exercise violation based on
“religious status” instead of “religious use.”86 The Court asserted that Montana's noaid provision barred religious schools, and parents who wished to send their children
to said schools, “from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the
schools.”87 Thus, the Court concluded, Montana’s scholarship program was subject
to strict scrutiny.88
First, in reaching its decision, the majority distinguished the case from Locke,
arguing that the tax-credit scholarship program involved pure status-based
discrimination.89 The Court posited that Montana’s program, unlike the program at
76. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251.
77. Id. at 2251.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2252.
80. Id.; see MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1). The majority did not determine whether Montana’s noaid provision was born of anti-Catholic sentiment. Instead, it agreed with the state that “the historical
record is complex.” Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2259. Justice Alito passionately—and hypocritically—
warned of the evils of discrimination in his concurrence. Id. at 2268 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[In Ramos
v. Louisiana] I argued in dissent that [discriminatory] motivation, though deplorable, had no bearing on
the laws’ constitutionality . . . . But I lost, and Ramos is now precedent. If the original motivation for
the laws mattered there, it certainly matters here.”). Justice Alito conspicuously failed to mention
discriminatory intent in an abortion case decided shortly after Ramos. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2153-2172 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); Strict Scrutiny: Trollito, THE APPEAL
(July 6, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (commenting on Justice Alito’s Espinoza concurrence: “it’s
a very opportunistic, performative humility”).
81. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2252.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2253.
84. Id. at 2254.
85. Id. at 2262-63.
86. Id. at 2255-56 (“This case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use.”); see
also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017).
87. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255.
88. Id. at 2257.
89. Id.
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issue in Locke, “does not zero in on any ‘essentially religious’ course of instruction,”
but rather “bars all aid to religious schools” because of what they are: religious
schools.90 To bolster its argument that Locke is distinguishable, the Court pointed to
the lack of founding-era support for Rule 1.91
Next, the majority determined that Montana’s justification for Rule 1 did not
satisfy strict scrutiny.92 It held that Montana could not justify excluding private
religious schools from the program because it wished to achieve a stronger separation
of church and state.93 Notably, the Court declared that: “[a] State need not subsidize
private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private
schools solely because they are religious.” 94
Finally, the Court dispensed with Montana’s argument that there was no Free
Exercise Clause violation “because the Montana Supreme Court ultimately
eliminated the scholarship program altogether.” 95 Two separate dissenters—Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor—agreed with Montana’s contention.96 The majority,
however, rebutted Montana’s assertion by arguing that the Montana Supreme Court
had no business terminating the program because it should have recognized that Rule
1 violated the Free Exercise Clause.97
In a third dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, argued that the
majority should have paid more attention to Establishment Clause precedent and
further engaged with the principle that there “is room for play in the joints” between
the Religion Clauses.98 The majority flatly rejected this suggestion, stating that the
dissent’s “‘room[y]’ or ‘flexible’ approaches to discrimination against religious
organizations and observers would mark a significant departure from our free
exercise precedents. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause do not depend on
a ‘judgment-by-judgment analysis’ regarding whether discrimination against
religious adherents would somehow serve ill-defined interests.”99
Espinoza was a major victory for school choice advocates, and it set extremely
favorable precedent. However, the decision left the status-use distinction intact,
providing a potential opening for school choice opponents and states who do not

90. Id. at 2257 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023).
91. Id. at 2257-59; see also Lipez, supra note 62, at 370.
92. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
93. Id. at 2260.
94. Id. at 2261.
95. Id. at 2261, 2262-63.
96. Id. at 2281 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan, J.) (noting that because the Montana
Supreme Court decision “put all private school parents in the same boat[,]” the “Court had no occasion
to address the matter”); id. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2262 (quoting Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018)
(“Had the Court recognized that this was, indeed, ‘one of those cases’ in which application of the no-aid
provision ‘would violate the Free Exercise Clause,’ the Court would not have proceeded to find a
violation of that provision. And, in the absence of such a state law violation, the Court would have had
no basis for terminating the program. Because the elimination of the program flowed directly from the
Montana Supreme Court’s failure to follow the dictates of federal law, it cannot be defended as a neutral
policy decision, or as resting on adequate and independent state law grounds.”)).
98. Id. at 2281-93, 2282 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]lay in the joints’ should, in my view, play a
determinative role here.”).
99. Id. at 2257.
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wish to fund private religious schools.100 This opening was central to the First
Circuit’s decision in Carson.101
III. CARSON EX REL. O.C. V. MAKIN
In Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, the First Circuit addressed the question of
whether Maine’s nonsectarian requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause, among
other claims.102
A. Facts and Procedural Background
If a school administrative unit (“SAU”) 103 in Maine does not (1) maintain a
public elementary or postsecondary school or (2) contract with another public
elementary or postsecondary school for school privileges, then the SAU must pay
tuition “at the public school or the approved private school of the parent’s choice at
which the student is accepted.”104 In order for a private school to be approved to
receive public funds for tuition, it must fulfil the nonsectarian requirement and be a
“nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”105
The plaintiff-appellants in Carson, who are represented by the Institute of
Justice (“IJ”), are three sets of parents of children who live in towns where the SAU
is obligated to pay tuition at a public or approved private school of the parents’
choice.106 Two of the sets of parents, the Carsons and Gilleses, send their children
to Bangor Christian School (“BCS”).107 The other parents, the Nelsons, use town
tuitioning to send their daughter to a state approved private school, but would prefer
to send her to Temple Academy (“TA”), which is a parochial school. 108 All three
sets of parents argued that the nonsectarian requirement discriminated against them
on the basis of religion and therefore violated their free exercise rights. 109
In the trial court, the parents argued that Trinity Lutheran had effectively
overruled a First Circuit precedential case: Eulitt v. Maine Department of
Education.110 Eulitt, which had very similar facts to Carson,111 was decided before

100. Id.
101. Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 2020).
102. Id. at 26.
103. Maine uses the term “school administrative unit” instead of the usual term, “school district.”
Each SAU has a different governance structure. See Structure & Governance, ME. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.maine.gov/doe/schools/structure [https://perma.cc/CY6C-KL3F] (last visited Apr. 21,
2021).
104. 20-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5203(4), 5204(4) (2018).
105. § 2951(2).
106. Carson, 979 F.3d at 26.
107. Id. at 27.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 32 (“The plaintiffs contend that the ‘nonsectarian’ requirement discriminates against them
based on their religion and thereby violates the Free Exercise Clause.”).
110. 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004); see Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F. Supp. 3d 207, 209-11
(D. Me. 2019).
111. Although the facts in Eulitt and Carson were very similar, there was one difference. In Eulitt,
the town that the parents lived contracted with a local public school, and therefore the parents could only
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Trinity Lutheran, and it relied heavily on Locke.112 In Eulitt, the First Circuit
interpreted Locke to mean that “state entities, in choosing how to provide education,
may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entanglement with religion,
even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so.”113 Applying
that reasoning, Eulitt held that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause because the state was simply exercising its legitimate right to
avoid excessive entanglement with religion. 114 In Carson, the district court
ultimately disagreed with the plaintiffs and determined that Trinity Lutheran did not
clearly overrule Eulitt.115 The court applied Eulitt to the facts of Carson and upheld
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement.116 The plaintiffs timely appealed the decision to
the First Circuit.117
The Supreme Court decided Espinoza nearly one year after the trial court’s
decision in Carson.118 In the wake of Espinoza, an IJ attorney released a statement
proclaiming that the decision “ensures that no state, whether it has a Blaine
Amendment or not, can exclude parents from choosing religious educational options
just because they participate in a private educational choice program.” 119 In light of
their win at the district court, the IJ attorneys representing the plaintiffs in Carson
hastily filed a 28(j) letter to the First Circuit.120 In the letter, the attorneys pulled
from Espinoza’s favorable language, asserting: “[w]hen otherwise eligible recipients
are disqualified from a public benefit ‘solely because of their religious character,’
we must apply strict scrutiny.” 121 In response to IJ’s new-found support, the state
of Maine contended that (1) “[t]he nature of the benefits at issue in Espinoza and
here are different,” and (2) Maine does not exclude sectarian schools because of their
“status,” but rather because they “use” funds to “promote or advance [a] particular
religion.”122 The First Circuit found merit in the State’s second argument: that
Maine does not exclude sectarian schools because of their “status.” 123
B. The First Circuit’s Analysis
After concluding that the parents had standing,124 the First Circuit explained that
send their children to private school if it were approved on an “individualized assessment of educational
benefit.” Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 346-47, 349 n.1.
112. Id. at 355.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 356.
115. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 211.
116. Id. at 211-12.
117. Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2020).
118. See generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Carson, 401 F.
Supp. 3d 207.
119. Kramer, supra note 13.
120. Statement of Supplemental Authority at 1, Carson, 979 F.3d 2 (No. 19-1746); see Fed. R. App.
P. 28(j).
121. Statement of Supplemental Authority at 2, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746).
122. Response to Statement of Supplemental Authority, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746).
123. Carson, 979 F.3d at 38.
124. The state contended that the parents could not show redressability because the private religious
schools in question would not “apply to be ‘approved’ to receive tuition assistance payments if, by
receiving such public funding, they would” subject themselves to the Maine Human Rights Act’s
prohibition against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 30. This was an
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the precedential case that controlled in the trial court, Eulitt, would not determine the
outcome of this matter.125 The court reasoned that Eulitt could not control because
of an exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine.126 The law-of-the-circuit doctrine
proclaims that circuit courts must follow precedent from their own court. 127
However, this general rule must yield when Supreme Court precedent legitimately
questions a circuit court’s previous opinion.128 Here, Trinity Lutheran, and now
Espinoza, called Eulitt into question because (1) Eulitt did not address whether the
nonsectarian requirement was based on religious “status” or “use,” and (2) both cases
offered insight on Locke that Eulitt did not have.129 Thus, the court decided that
Eulitt fell under the exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine and could not
control.130
After deciding that Eulitt would not determine the outcome of the case, the First
Circuit addressed the parents’ Free Exercise Claim in light of Trinity Lutheran and
Espinoza. The parents argued that the nonsectarian requirement “impermissibly
single[d] them out for unequal treatment based on religion,” and excluded them from
a public benefit on the basis of their religious status. 131 To determine whether
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement involved status-based discrimination, the court
examined (1) “[w]hat constitutes discrimination based ‘solely on religious status,’”
(2) whether the nonsectarian requirement discriminated based on status, and (3)
whether, if the requirement did not discriminate based on status, it “punish[ed] the
plaintiffs’ religious exercise nonetheless.”132
First, to define the term “status-based discrimination,” the court analyzed the
language from Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran.133 The court observed that in both of
those cases—where the state programs did discriminate on the basis of status—the
rules excluding religious entities used language like “controlled” or “owned” by a
church or “religiously-affiliated.”134 It further observed that in Espinoza, the
Supreme Court noted that discrimination against a recipient based on its “affiliation
with or control by a religious institution differ[s] from discrimination in handing out
that aid based on the religious use to which the recipient would put it.”135
Second, after examining the language and reasoning behind Maine’s
nonsectarian requirement, the court concluded that the nonsectarian requirement did
interesting and creative argument on the state’s part, and it garnered the attention of the ACLU of
Maine. See ACLU in Court in Case Over Taxpayer-Funded Religious Training, ACLU MAINE (June
24, 2019), https://www.aclumaine.org/en/press-releases/aclu-court-case-over-taxpayer-funded-religioustraining [https://perma.cc/J2T8-A4C4]. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the state’s standing argument
because even if BCS and TA decided not to participate in town tuitioning, “the invalidation of §
2951(2)'s ‘nonsectarian’ requirement would restore the plaintiffs' now non-existent opportunity to find
religious education for their children that qualifies for public funding.” Carson, 979 F.3d at 31.
125. Carson, 979 F.3d at 32.
126. Id. at 32-36.
127. United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
128. Carson, 979 F.3d at 32-33.
129. Id. at 33-35.
130. Id. at 32.
131. Id. at 36-37.
132. Id. at 37.
133. Id. at 37-38.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).

328

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

not discriminate on the basis of status.136 The nonsectarian requirement reads: “[a]
private school may be approved for the receipt of public funds for tuition purposes
only if it . . . [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution.”137 In other words, a private school may participate
in town tuitioning—and be eligible to receive public funds—so long as it is not a
religious school. The plain reading of the requirement seems to suggest that the
statute discriminates on the basis of status. However, the First Circuit disagreed and
instead determined that it “impose[d] a use-based restriction.”138
The court explained that this was not status-based discrimination because both
the former and current Commissioners of the Maine Department of Education and
the Attorney General agreed that Maine’s “determination [of] whether a school is
‘nonsectarian’ depends on the sectarian nature of the educational instruction that the
school will use the tuition assistance payments to provide.”139 This was in contrast
to the states’ prohibitions in Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran, which were based on
whether the school was “controlled by a church.”140 Thus, under the First Circuit’s
reading, if a state excludes a religious entity from a public benefit because it is
controlled by a church then it is status-based discrimination. On the other hand, if a
state excludes a religious entity from a public benefit because it will use the benefit
for a religious purpose, then it is employing permissible use-based discrimination
under Locke, Trinity Lutheran, and Espinoza. The court also highlighted that the
nonsectarian requirement states that a private school may be eligible to enroll in town
tuitioning so long as it is “a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 141 The court stated that the phrase
“in accordance with the First Amendment” gave credit to the state’s argument that
the nonsectarian requirement is indeed constitutional. 142 In sum, the court surmised
that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not discriminate on the basis of status.143
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that there was no legitimate difference between
discrimination based on status versus use, and therefore, the nonsectarian
requirement did punish their religious exercise. 144 In making this argument, the
plaintiffs relied on Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinions in Trinity Lutheran and
Espinoza.145 The court rejected this argument, pointing out that “nothing in either
one of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrences suggests that the government penalizes a
fundamental right simply because it declines to subsidize it.” 146 The court
determined that the nonsectarian requirement simply declined to subsidize religious
education because (1) the program is merely an avenue for “students who cannot get
136. Id. at 38.
137. 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018).
138. Carson, 979 F.3d at 38.
139. Id. at 37-38.
140. Id. at 39.
141. 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018); see Carson, 979 F.3d at 39.
142. Carson, 979 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 42 (“Instead, we understand this restriction to bar BCS and TA from receiving the
funding based on the religious use that they would make of it in instructing children in the tuition
assistance program.”).
144. See id. at 42.
145. Id. at 40-41.
146. Id. at 44.
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a public school education from their own SAU . . . [to] get an education that is
‘roughly equivalent to the education they would receive in public schools;’” and (2)
Maine’s decision to restrict religious teachings in its public schools—and its town
tuitioning program—“is also wholly legitimate, as there is no question that Maine
may require its public schools to provide a secular educational curriculum rather than
a sectarian one.”147
C. Holding
In summary, the First Circuit concluded that, even in light of Trinity Lutheran
and Espinoza, strict scrutiny did not apply, and the nonsectarian requirement did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause.148 In coming to this conclusion, the court
determined that (1) Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not discriminate on the
basis of status, and (2) Maine’s town tuitioning program does not need to provide
funding to parochial schools because the program is simply a way of connecting
“students who cannot get a public school education from their own SAU” with a
public education equivalent, and it is within Maine’s discretion to provide a secular
public education.149
IV. STANDING ON UNSTEADY GROUND
Although Carson provides some much welcome reassurance to states that do
not wish to fund private parochial schools, the decision rests on precedent that may
not prove to be durable. Some argue that the new conservative super-majority may
decide to abandon the status-use distinction altogether.150
For one, two key conservative justices disfavor the status-use distinction.
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined Chief Justice Roberts’ Espinoza opinion,
have both expressed skepticism of the status-use line. Justice Gorsuch remarked in
his Espinoza concurrence that “any jurisprudence grounded on a status-use
distinction seems destined to yield more questions than answers.”151 Justice Thomas
joined Justice Gorsuch’s Trinity Lutheran concurrence, where the Court originally
deployed the status-use distinction.152 In that opinion, Justice Gorsuch lamented, “I
harbor doubts about the stability of such a line.”153 In addition, Justice Sotomayor

147. Id. 45-46.
148. Id. at 42-54.
149. Id. at 40, 42-46. The Court also determined that the nonsectarian requirement did not violate
the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights on the basis of religious animus. Id. at 52-54.
150. See Michael Bindas, The Status of Use-Based Exclusions & Educational Choice After
Espinoza, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 204, 216 (2020) (suggesting that Espinoza indicates that the
Court may be willing to abandon the status-use distinction); see also Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”).
151. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2275 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
152. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025-26 (2017) (Gorsuch.
J., concurring in part, joined by Thomas, J.).
153. Id. at 2025.

330

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

has also expressed disapproval of the status-use distinction.154
Such skepticism is warranted, as the line makes little logical sense. Religious
organizations naturally put their funds to religious uses. 155 Further, most religious
schools tout religious teachings as a benefit of the education that they offer. 156
Because religious status and use are so enmeshed, it makes little sense for the
constitutionality of a law to turn on whether it excludes a religious entity from a
benefit based on its religious status or religious use.
Although the status-use standard is mystifying, it is challenging to find a
workable alternative. For those who are wary of entanglement of church and state,
the only other feasible alternative to the status-use distinction is the principle that
there is “play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses.157 Justice Breyer vouched
for this principle in his Espinoza dissent,158 but “play in the joints” is less of a
standard and more of an amorphous guideline. 159 Further, with Justice Ginsburg’s
passing, it is likely that only three Justices would sign on to the “play in the joints”
approach.160 Given the precedent and the conservative composition of the Supreme
Court, school choice opponents will likely need to look beyond the courts to stop the
school choice movement’s momentum.
V. THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE IN MAINE
After the First Circuit’s decision, IJ immediately filed a petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.161 IJ Senior Attorney Tim Keller proclaimed that
the decision “allows the state of Maine to continue discriminating against families
and students seeking to attend religious schools.” 162 If the Carson plaintiffs are
granted certiorari and Section 2951(2) is invalidated, it could have a negative impact
on Maine’s public education system, specifically, in public schools that have a high
percentage of town tuitioning students. Setting aside the issue of religious schools,
public schools lose funding when town tuitioning students choose private schools.
This is because Maine’s public school funding model, Essential Programs and
154. Id. at 2030 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (questioning the difference between use and status:
“[t]he playground surface cannot be confined to secular use any more than lumber used to frame the
Church’s walls, glass stained and used to form its windows, or nails used to build its altar”).
155. Id. at 2029-30 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
156. In Carson, the schools that the plaintiffs wished to send their children to provide a “biblicallyintegrated education,” and pursue a mission of “instilling a Biblical worldview.” Carson ex rel. O.C. v.
Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2020).
157. As discussed in Part II(a)-(b), the days of an Establishment Clause that calls for strict separation
of church and state have come and gone. See Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 54, at 272.
158. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2282 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Lipez, supra note 62, at 336 n.58.
160. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan, J. in Part I) (Justice
Kagan did not join Part II of Justice Breyer’s dissent that discussed play in the joints at greater length,
but Part I forcefully declared: “‘play in the joints’ should, in my view, play a determinative role here”);
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2035-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
161. Carson, 979 F.3d 21, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 9, 2021) (No. 20-1088); Andrew
Wimer, Maine Parents Challenging Law Excluding Religious Schools from State’s Tuition Program
Will Appeal to Supreme Court, THE INST. FOR JUST. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/maineparents-challenging-maine-law-excluding-religious-schools-from-states-tuition-program-will-appeal-tosupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/J4C5-DFPJ].
162. Wimer, supra note 161.
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Services (“EPS”), largely doles out funding based on SAU pupil counts. 163 Under
EPS, when students leave a school, they take their dollars with them. As Maine
school enrollment rates have dropped over the years due to rural population
decline,164 rural public schools have become increasingly dependent on their town
tuitioning students to remain solvent.165 To date, Maine has only approved eight
primary private schools and twelve private postsecondary schools for participation
in town tuitioning.166 In short, even though public schools have a relatively small
number of private schools to compete with, they are still desperate to retain their
town tuitioning students and dollars.167
If private religious schools are permitted to participate in the program as well,
the number of town tuitioning students choosing private schools would surely grow,
making this existing problem worse. 168 Let us take a hypothetical Maine high school
as an example of how this would play out. Each grade has one-hundred children in
it and thirty of those children are from towns that use town tuitioning. Each of these
children attend this school because they have elected to go to the closest public
school. However, when more private schools in the area become approved for town
tuitioning, twelve children in each grade leave to attend various private schools. 169
When those students leave, the school loses the funding it received for those fortyeight children. While the school may be able to cut some costs, it still needs to pay
the teachers the same salary, maintain the same building, bus students, and deliver
163. Essential Programs and Services (EPS) Funding, ME. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.maine.gov/doe/funding/gpa/eps [https://perma.cc/QT6Z-E6YG] (last visited Apr. 21,
2021).
164. Maine’s student enrollment rates have declined at about 9.4% in recent years, and rural areas
have seen the largest enrollment declines. Gordon Donaldson, Maine Schools in Focus: Declining
School Enrollment Likely to Subside in Next Decade, UNIV. OF S. ME. COLL. OF EDUC. AND HUM. DEV.
(Oct. 6, 2016), https://umaine.edu/edhd/2016/10/06/maine-schools-focus-declining-school-enrollmentlikely-subside-next-decade/ [https://perma.cc/XG5T-8K8C]. Superintendent Gisele Dionne of the
Madawaska School Department lost 43% of her student body from 2007 to 2017. Dionne explained that
“the loss of students has forced the school to make major changes” and “[e]ven though the district
serves fewer students, many costs such as electricity, heating and transportation remain unchanged.”
Tyler Blint-Welsh, The Maine Schools that Have Shrunk the Most, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23,
2019), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/12/12/education/the-maine-schools-that-have-shrunk-themost/ [https://perma.cc/D8F4-M3CT].
165. Nell Gluckman, As Maine Student Numbers Drop, High Schools Compete for Kids, Tuition
Dollars, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 14, 2014), https://bangordailynews.com/2014/02/14/news/bangor/
as-maine-student-numbers-drop-high-schools-compete-for-kids-and-tuition-dollars/ [https://perma.cc/
2P7P-4S6S].
166. Private Schools Approved for the Receipt of Public Funds, ME. DEPT. OF EDUC., https://
www.maine.gov/doe/sites/maine.gov.doe/files/inline-files/FY21_PrivateSchoolsApprovedTuition_
22Oct2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DKJ-ABLB] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
167. Gluckman, supra note 165.
168. One older data set showed that about 42% of Maine town tuitioning students choose to attend
private schools. John Maddaus & Denise A. Mirochnik, Town Tuitioning in Maine: Parental Choice of
Secondary Schools in Rural Communities, 8 J. RSCH. RURAL EDUC. 27, 30 (1992). In Alna, Maine,
which offers town tuitioning for both private and elementary, more students attend private schools than
public schools. Further, individuals are seeking to relocate to Alna to take advantage of the town
tuitioning, which has sparked controversy among local residents. School Choice Costs Spark Turmoil in
Small Maine Town, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://bangordailynews.com/2018/03/07/
news/school-choice-costs-spark-turmoil-in-small-maine-town/ [https://perma.cc/XM3Q-GLVK].
169. Maddaus & Mirochnik, supra note 168, at 30.
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the same programs and services. Thus, even though the school has fewer children in
it—and therefore less funding—it largely maintains the same expenses.170 To help
alleviate some of the funding issues that town tuitioning brings, Maine could decide
to exclude private schools from the town tuitioning program altogether.
Even if the Carson plaintiffs are denied certiorari and the case ends here, more
school choice litigation is on the way. IJ currently has five other educational choice
cases pending in other states, and it will likely file more. 171 In fact, IJ has cases that
are nearly identical to Carson pending in both Vermont and New Hampshire, the
other states that have town tuitioning programs. 172 New Hampshire is in the First
Circuit, but Vermont is in the Second Circuit which could yield a different
interpretation of Espinoza. IJ holds itself out “as the nation’s preeminent courtroom
defender of educational choice programs,” and there is surely more action to come. 173
Given this situation, Maine—and the rest of the country—must consider the
impacts of school choice and what it could mean for public education. Proponents
of educational choice argue that “[t]hese programs give families financial assistance
to choose private schooling that best fits their children's individual needs.”174 On the
other hand, skeptics posit that school choice programs primarily benefit families who
are already well-off and do not include the conditions necessary “for a fair and equal
scheme of school choice.”175 These conditions would include things such as (1)
prohibiting parents “from adding money to the voucher they receive, so that income
deficiencies are neutralized,” and (2) only providing vouchers to economically
disadvantaged children.176 Necessary restrictions such as these are not in the
proposals presented by organizations like IJ and American Federation for
Children.177 If our goal is to give children “a chance at a great education, no matter
where they live,”178 we should fund and fix the public school system we already have
in place, instead of further fracturing it and out-sourcing public education to private
interest groups like private schools and religious organizations.

170. See Blint-Welsh, supra note 164.
171. According to its website, IJ has school choice cases pending in Vermont, New Hampshire, and
Tennessee; it also has two school choice cases pending in North Carolina. All Cases, THE INST. FOR
JUST., https://ij.org/cases/all-cases/ [https://perma.cc/HZ29-DWV6] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
172. Andrew Wimer, New Hampshire Grandparents Sue State Over Unconstitutional Restriction on
School ‘Tuitioning’ Program, THE INST. FOR JUST. (Sept. 3, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/newhampshire-grandparents-sue-state-over-unconstitutional-restriction-on-school-tuitioning-program/
[https://perma.cc/52AE-W9DA]; Justin Wilson, Vermont Parents Sue State Over Unconstitutional
School Choice Policy, THE INST. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/vermontparents-sue-state-over-unconstitutional-school-choice-policy/ [https://perma.cc/2DXE-BECX].
173. Educational Choice, supra note 2.
174. Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious Options
from School Choice Programs, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 88, 88 (2017) (arguing for school choice
and that Blaine amendments are unconstitutional).
175. Yossi Dahan, Privatization, School Choice and Educational Equality, 5 L. & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 307, 328 (2011).
176. Id. at 324.
177. See generally School Choice in America, AM. FED’N FOR CHILD., https://www.federationfor
children.org/school-choice-america/ [https://perma.cc/D352-X4G6] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021);
Educational Choice, supra note 2.
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